After an analysis of China's listed companies' ten years-practice of policies for dividend on shares, we think that, whether compared with the theory of classical theory of dividend on shares or with the practice of Western countries, China's financial behavior in this respect has a lot of puzzles, or you can call them 'Riddles of China's Dividend on Shares'. By a simplified financing model, we have expounded the fact that the system root of producing these 'riddles' is China's peculiar structure of share ownership, i.e. the separation of stock ownership. This, together with the holding position of non-floating stock and low investment cost, makes acute the problem (especially of interest clashes between non-floating stock owners and their agents on the one hand and floating stock owners on the other) of encouragement in financial decision making in China's listed companies. In the present China's economy where external binding loses efficiency, because these stock-holding owners and their agents as 'insiders' can almost do as they please and can, under the cloak of various' legal' financial behavior, spoil the interest of owners of floating shares, thus resulting in distortion in financial decision-making mechanism, not surprising at all is the alienation of the behavior of distribution of dividend on shares.