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非对称信息条件下的企业经营者激励契约设计 被引量:25

The Design of the Corporate Operators' Incentive Contracts under Asymmetric Information Condition
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摘要 由于信息不对称,企业董事会不能观测到企业经营者工作的努力水平,因此,企业董事会需要对企业经营者进行激励.本文探讨了将能力系数和市场调研成本引入最优激励契约模型,给出了相应的最优风险激励系数和代理成本,并分析了各因素对它们的影响.通过"标尺竞争"可以提高激励强度,降低代理成本,增强激励的有效性. Because of the information asymmetry,the board of director of enterprise can't notice how hard managers work.Therefore,the board of director of enterprise needs to motivate them.This paper attempts to probe into the optimum motivation agreement model into which ability coefficients and market survey cost are introduced.Besides,it provides the corresponding optimum risk and motivation coefficients as well as the agency cost,and has analyzed the impacts on them by every factor.The paper also indicates that yardstick competition can improve the intensity of motivation,reduce the agency cost,and strengthen the validity of motivation.
作者 岳中志
出处 《数量经济技术经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第2期 50-55,共6页 The Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics
关键词 激励机制 契约 不对称信息 标尺竞争 Motivation Mechanism Agreement Asymmetric Information,Yardstick Competition
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