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经理管理防御对现金股利支付影响的实证研究 预览 被引量:18

An Empirical Analysis of Management Entrenchment Effect on Cash Dividend Payment
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摘要 本文在系统阐述经理管理防御对企业现金股利支付水平影响因素的基础上,以我国上市公司为对象,选取2004-2006年的数据进行实证研究。结果表明,经理人的经营业绩、财务杠杆和公司规模对上市公司的现金股利支付水平影响比较明显;而经理人持股比例、经理人员任期长短和第一大股东持股比例对企业现金股利政策影响不明显,这主要与我国目前企业不同性质的股权结构、经理人员任免等政策有关。但当第一大股东持有的为流通股份时,其持股比例与现金股利支付水平明显呈正相关。以上说明,经理管理防御对企业现金股利政策具有显著影响。 The paper was based on the basement of factors of management entrenchment influencing the level of cash dividend payment.We took the listed company as the object and selected the three years' data of 2004~2006 to research.The result indicated that between directors' management performances,financial leverage level,the size of company and the level of cash dividend listed company were remarkable correlation.On the contrary,fraction of shares owned by managers,the managers' tenure and fraction of shares owned by the largest block holder were unobvious related with cash dividend policy of the enterprise.This result is mainly related with the different ownership structure and the policy of the mangers' tenure in Chinese enterprises.But when fraction of shares owned by managers was circulated stock,the result was remarkable correlation. This indicated that management entrenchment has important effect on cash dividend payment.
作者 李秉祥 张明 武晓春 LI Bing-xiang ZHANG Ming WU Xiao-chun(School of Business Management,Xi'an University of Technology,Xi'an 710048,China)
出处 《中南财经政法大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第6期 134-140,共7页 Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics
基金 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目“基于终极所有权结构差异的代理问题与融资决策研究”(70672054)
关键词 经理管理防御 现金股利 经营业绩 财务杠杆 Management Entrenchment Cash Dividend Payment Corporate Performance Financial Leverage
作者简介 李秉祥(1964-),男,陕西扶风人,西安理工大学工商管理学院教授、博导。 张明(1982-),男,山东济南人,西安理工大学工商管理学院研究生。 武晓春(1983-),女,山西祁县人,西安理工大学工商管理学院研究生。
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