期刊文献+

政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性 被引量:616

Political Connections, Rent Seeking, and the Fiscal Subsidy Efficiency of Local Governments
收藏 分享 导出
摘要 本文以我国民营上市公司为样本,分析与地方政府建立政治联系的企业是否能够比无政治联系的企业获得更多的财政补贴。结果发现,与地方政府建立政治联系的民营企业确实能够获得更多的财政补贴;而且,在制度环境越差的地区,政治联系的这种补贴获取效应越强。进一步的检验发现,与地方政府建立政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效及社会绩效负相关,而无政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效及社会绩效正相关。本文的研究结果支持民营企业建立政治联系的寻租假设,即民营企业通过与地方政府建立政治联系来俘获掌握着财政补贴支配权的地方政府官员,进而得到更多的财政补贴收入;在制度约束弱的地区,这种寻租行为更加盛行。就地方政府的公共政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,地方政府基于政治联系的财政补贴支出会扭曲整个社会稀缺资源的有效配置,降低社会的整体福利水平。 This paper tests whether private firms with political connections of local governments get more fiscal subsidies from local government than those without political connection. Using China' s listed private firms as sample, we find that private firms with political connection do get more fiscal subsidies than the counterparts, and that poorer the institutional environments are, stronger the subsidy acquiring effect of political connections is. Further results find that subsidies obtained by firms with political connections are negatively related with firm performance and social performance, while subsidies obtained by firms without political connections are positively related with firm performance and social performance. Above evidence supports the rent-seeking hypothesis of political connections, namely, via political connections, private firms capture local government officers who have the rights to distribute fiscal subsidies, and therefore get as much subsidy revenues as possible. In weaker province where the private firms are located, more prevailitlg the rent-seeking behaviors are. Our results suggest that the fiscal subsidy policies of local governments, based on private firms' political connections, result in the distortion of scarce resources allocation and the decrease in the wbole social welfare.
作者 余明桂 回雅甫 潘红波 Yu Minggui, Hui Yafu and Pan Hongbo (Economics and Management School, Wuhan University)
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第3期65-77,共13页 Economic Research Journal
基金 作者特别感谢两位审稿人提出的诸多富有建设性的建议 我们还要感谢夏新平、罗琦、孔东民、李广子、陈冬以及参加第六届中国金融学年会和第八届中国实证会计国际研讨会的与会同仁的有益讨论 同时感谢苏灵、屈轶、朱君妍和黄碧琪出色的助理研究工作,当然文责自负.本文的研究得到国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70602013、70972090和70902052)的资助.
关键词 政治联系 财政补贴 寻租 政府俘获 Political Connection Fiscal Subsidy Rent Seeking State Capture
作者简介 电子信箱:mingyu-whu@yahoo.com.cn
  • 相关文献

参考文献28

共引文献1766

同被引文献8642

二级引证文献5585

投稿分析

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部 意见反馈
新型冠状病毒肺炎防控与诊疗专栏