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产业精准扶贫的剩余控制权冲突及治理 预览

Residual Control Rights Conflicts and Governance of Industrial Targeted Poverty Alleviation
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摘要 从不完全契约的理论视角,运用“剩余控制权”的概念,分析产业精准扶贫中政府、扶贫企业和贫困农户之间的矛盾与冲突。研究发现,产业精准扶贫的剩余控制权冲突主要表现为:扶贫产业选择合理性与紧迫性之间的冲突;扶贫产业开发盈利性与政治性之间的冲突;扶贫产业发展嵌入性与挤出性之间的冲突。应当从明确产业精准扶贫中的权利义务关系、制定产权整合规则、提高社会嵌入程度和完善法律解决机制等方面化解剩余控制权冲突,以降低扶贫产业开发风险,减少扶贫产业开发的交易成本,增加贫困农户的内生工作能力,促进产业精准扶贫质量的提升。 From the theoretical perspective of incomplete contract, the concept of “residual control rights” is used to analyze the contradictions and conflicts among the government, enterprises and poor farmers in the industrial targeted poverty alleviation. The study found that the conflicts of residual control rights in the industry s targeted poverty alleviation are mainly as follows: conflicts between the rationality and urgency;conflicts between profitability and politics;conflicts between the embeddedness and extrudability. The conflicts should be resolved from clarifying the rights and obligations, formulating property rights integration rules, improving social embeddedness and improving legal settlement mechanisms, so as to reduce the risk and the transaction costs in poverty alleviation industry development, and increase the endogenous working capacity of poor farmers, improve the quality of industrial targeted poverty alleviation.
作者 贺林波 谢美娟 HE Lin-bo;XIE Mei-juan(College of Public Administration and Law, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410118, China)
出处 《华南农业大学学报:社会科学版》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第4期1-9,共9页 Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金 国家社会科学基金青年项目(15BZZ087).
关键词 产业扶贫 精准扶贫 剩余控制权 不完全契约 industrial poverty alleviation targeted poverty alleviation residual control rights incomplete contract
作者简介 贺林波(1973—),男,湖南益阳人,湖南农业大学公共管理与法学学院教授,主要研究方向为农村公共管理、危机管理。Email:helinbo@hunau.edu.cn.
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