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属地责任制下的谋利型上访:生成机制与治理逻辑 被引量:1

Profit-Seeking Petitions in the Territorial Responsibility System: Generation Mechanism and Governance Logic
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摘要 谋利型上访作为一种新型的、急剧凸显的农民上访行为,对其生成机制和治理逻辑的分析具有重要的理论和政策意义。本文基于制度分析的视角,通过考察信访制度本身提炼出'属地责任制'的分析性概念,构建信访制度与上访行为的关联性分析框架,基于典型案例的历时性比较分析,研究信访属地责任制如何内部生产出谋利型上访。研究发现,信访属地责任制中上级政府的激励逻辑、村级两委的应付逻辑造成基层政府的避责逻辑,并共同导致了上访谋利空间的生成。基层政府的初始示范、农民上访的自我示范和村庄场域中的社会示范,分别结合上访谋利空间促成谋利型上访的发生、持续和扩散。基层政府的信访治理策略经历了从专断型治理到利益型治理的变迁。其治理逻辑是属地责任制中基层政府'责重权轻'的权责不匹配形成'利用公共资源解决部门及官员政治风险'的目标替代。上述结论对破解谋利型上访这一基层治理难题具有一定启发意义,包括弱化信访压力体制、强化基层治理能力、动员村庄自治力量、推进信访治理法治化。 The profit-seeking petition is a new type of peasant petitioning behavior that is sharply highlighted.The objective of this paper is to study the production mechanism and governance logic of profit-seeking petitions,and explain how the petition-responsible land liability system internally produces profit-seeking petitions.Based on the perspective of institutional analysis,this paper refines the analytical concept of'Territorial Responsibility System',constructs the correlation analysis framework of petition system and petition behavior,and conducts comparative analysis of typical cases.The research in this paper finds that the motivation logic of the higher-level government in the petition-responsibility system and the coping logic of the village-level two committees have caused the grass-roots government to avoid the logic of responsibility,and jointly led to the creation of the profit-seeking space.The initial demonstration of the grass-roots government,the self-demonstration of the farmers’petitions and the social demonstration in the village field,respectively,combined with the petitioning for profit,promoted the occurrence,persistence and spread of profit-seeking petitions.The grass-roots government’s petition management strategy has experienced changes from arbitrary governance to interest-based governance.The governance logic is the mismatch of powers and responsibilities of the grassroots government in the territorial responsibility system leading to the goal substitution.The conclusion of the article has certain enlightening significance for solving the problem of grassroots governance of profit-seeking petitions,including weakening the pressure system of petition,strengthening the ability of grassroots governance,mobilizing the autonomy of villages,and promoting the rule of law in petition.
作者 郑永君 Zheng Yongjun(Institute of China Rural Studies,Central China Normal University,Wuhan,430079,China;Institute of Political Science Advanced Studies,Central China Normal University,Wuhan,430079,China)
出处 《公共管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第2期41-56,170共17页 Journal of Public Management
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC810024).
关键词 属地责任制 谋利型上访 生成机制 治理逻辑 Territorial Responsibility System Profit-seeking Petition Generation Mechanism Governance Logic
作者简介 郑永君(1989-),男,华中师范大学中国农村研究院、政治科学高等研究院助理研究员、博士研究生,研究方向:基层治理与社区发展,E-mail:ccnu701@qq.com。
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